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The Need for a J-4 Planning Cell to Support Indigenous Security Forces

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

To have an effective security phase, a planning cell needs to be created within the Joint or Combined staff, at the beginning of planning for an operation, that will focus solely on the support of host indigenous security forces after phase III. The cell must continually analyze the indigenous security forces post-combat logistical capabilities, create a number of courses of action to correct any deficiencies, and to ensure the chosen courses of action are implemented once phase III ends. This will be supported using three short case studies and analysis. No single case study proves the need for the J-4 planning cell. Rather, the case studies will step through evolving lessons, each building on the previous, concluding with a lesson and analysis of who should provide logistical support to indigenous security forces.

INTRODUCTION

This paper will argue that in order to have effective security and stabilization, a planning cell needs to be created within the J-4 of a Joint or Combined staff at the beginning of planning for an operation, which will focus solely on the robust support of indigenous security forces after phase III. The cell must continually analyze the indigenous security forces post-combat logistical capabilities, create a number of courses of action to correct any deficiencies, and ensure the chosen courses of action are implemented once phase III ends and SSTR begins.

This will be supported using three short case studies and analysis. No single case study proves the need for the J-4 planning cell. Rather, the case studies will step through evolving lessons, each building on the previous, concluding with a lesson and analysis of who should provide logistical support to indigenous security forces. The first lesson in this progressive understanding is the military should not be used as a long term police force. Knowing the military cannot be an effective long-term police force, the next lesson is realizing the need for indigenous security forces. Then it must be understood that the indigenous security forces will require logistical assistance if they are to be effective and eventually self-sustaining. Finally, the analysis will end with the conclusion that the occupying United State force should assist the indigenous security forces with their logistical needs, and the operational commander must put a planning cell in the J-4 to plan for this.

BACKGROUND

United States politicians and military leaders, from the strategic level down to the operational level, have learned a lot from past conflicts about Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. Despite this understanding of the high level strategic

design of this phase, there are gaps in the planning process at the Operational level. The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities states, “We have learned to provide adequate resources for “as long as it takes” for combat, but we often don’t provide adequate resources for a sufficient period for stabilization and reconstruction.”¹

Not properly planning for post combat operations may allow security concerns to sidetrack nation building efforts. Someone must provide for security, but the United States military cannot be and does not want to be a long term police force. They have not trained properly or been equipped properly to function as a police force for another nation.² Therefore the logical choice to provide security is an indigenous security force. No security force can be effective operationally and self-sustaining without well established logistics supporting them.

THE UNITED STATES PAST EXPERIENCE IN SSTR OPERATIONS

The United States has a long history of involvement in conflicts around the world involving nation building. Three different conflicts in which the U.S. was involved, and in one case still is, deserve focused attention because they offer relevant lessons learned. Those conflicts are the American Civil War, Operation Just Cause, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The first of these examples of American involvement in rebuilding a nation was the operation following the Civil War. By the time the war ended in 1865, Congress was finalizing plans on exactly how the stabilization and rebuilding of the South would be

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, December 2004), 8.

² Robert M. Perito, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” United States Institute of Peace, (April 2005 Special Report No. 137), 1, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr137.html> (accessed 28 March 2009).

accomplished.³ The government recognized that they would have to maintain strict order, and in 1867 passed legislation putting the Army in complete control.⁴ This was effective in some respects when it came to helping rebuild and set up new government structures, but the negative aspects of the policy soon were evident.

Small guerrilla uprisings and organizations like the Ku Klux Klan were appearing all over the South causing unrest and prompting President U. S. Grant to send the Army to squelch these uprisings.⁵ The Army's efforts to quell this violence were only marginally successful. Added to the problem was the fact that the civilian population resented being under the control of the Army, reducing the effectiveness of the Army.⁶ "As General William T. Sherman somberly noted, the Army did not have the power to change the feelings of most white Southerners, nor could it subjugate the South in perpetuity."⁷ The conclusion could be made that limited effectiveness of the Army and the resentment of the population allowed the uprisings to take place.

The relevant lesson from the Civil War is the United States military is not an ideal police force and should only be used for limited policing tasks, and even then only for a limited amount of time in support of SSTR operations.

In 1989 President George Bush initiated Operation Just Cause to oust General Manuel Noriega from his dictatorship in Panama.⁸ Planning for what to do after ousting Noriega

³ Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 6.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 59.

⁷ Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 7.

⁸ U.S. Army, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1985), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/90-9/9091key.htm> (accessed 15 April 2009).

should have been a top priority, but little guidance was given for what to do after combat.⁹ United States seemed to know the military is not the best police force going into Operation Just Cause because post conflict security was not in the list of limited objectives.¹⁰ Therefore, during the planning process an assumption was made that local police forces would handle all safety and security operations once the United States removed General Noriega.¹¹ The operational objectives also did not include any specific tasks that involved helping the local or indigenous security forces maintain security and stability.¹² The local military, the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), was left with the responsibility of providing security and stability after combat, but they were ineffective.¹³ The evidence points to a failure on the part of the American leadership to acknowledge the fact that the Panamanian Defense Force would be greatly reduced in power after the conflict, and therefore unable to perform the functions necessary to prevent the U.S. military from once again having to become a police force.

In the lessons learned after Operation Just Cause, the United States military began to realize that after such conflicts, the local forces responsible for security would be weakened. A post-operation analysis produced by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, notes the fact

⁹ William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters* (Autumn 2003), 96, <http://proquest.umi.com/> (accessed 29 March 2009).

¹⁰ U.S. Army, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1985), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/90-9/9091his.htm> (accessed 29 March 2009).

¹¹ U.S. Army, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1985), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/90-9/9091his.htm> (accessed 29 March 2009).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Robert M. Perito, "The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified," United States Institute of Peace, April 2005 Special Report No. 137, 12, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr137.html> (accessed 28 March 2009).

that planning must take place in advance to assist those indigenous security forces.¹⁴

Although the analysis outlined many lessons learned, only one came close to addressing ways to help the indigenous security forces. This lesson showed up in the logistical section, and it points out that in future SSTR operations the United States should be prepared to help with the transportation needs of the host nation.¹⁵ This leads to the conclusion that the United States military realized the indigenous security forces should be used. What the United States did not take into account was the fact that those indigenous security forces were weak after combat and required logistical assistance.

Operation Iraqi Freedom provides the final lessons that suggest the operational commander must provide logistical support for the indigenous security forces. In 2007 Thomas Mockaitis notes that Iraq poses the greatest security challenge the United States military has ever faced.¹⁶ In Operation Iraqi Freedom the desired end state was and still is a peaceful democratic Iraq, which hopefully will lead to a more peaceful Middle East.¹⁷ With that end state in mind, planning for post-combat operations should have been critical during the planning phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Tom Donnelly & Vance Serchuk of the American Enterprise Institute make the argument that the U.S. military and the civilian leadership were again focusing almost entirely on combat and not properly planning for the

¹⁴ U.S. Army, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1985), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/90-9/9093c14.htm> (accessed 20 April 2009).

¹⁵ U.S. Army, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1985), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/90-9/9093c14.htm> (accessed 29 March 2009).

¹⁶ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *The Iraq War: Learning From the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future*, Strategic Studies Institute (U.S. Army War College, 2007), 1.

¹⁷ James Dobbins, et al, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2003), 167.

SSTR phases of the operation.¹⁸ That focus seems to imply that operations after the big battle have ended are not properly planned. The planners and leaders of the operation either did not fully comprehend the total lack of, or significantly reduced capacity of, infrastructure and institutions that would be necessary for indigenous security forces to function properly.¹⁹

When planning Operation Iraqi Freedom, United States operational planners made the same mistakes as the planners in Operation Just Cause. They incorrectly assumed that civil institutions, like the police force, would still be intact and usable after major combat operations.²⁰ Based on that assumption, the United States would not need to take a lead role in phase IV hostilities.²¹ Evidence points to the fact that it was a mistake to make this assumption. Besides mistakenly planning for local police to be present and effective, the strategic leadership in the United States further complicated the issue by disbanding the Iraqi Army.²² The idea that the Iraqi Army could have helped with the security and stability is generally known.

After the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003²³, Central Command (CENTCOM) finally began to appreciate the security challenges. It was only then that CENTCOM started to plan for the creation and use of an indigenous security force, which would be called the Iraqi Civil

¹⁸ Tom Donnelly, Vance Serchuk, "Preparing to Fight the Next War," *The Weekly Standard*, 01 December 2003, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/420asjbh.asp?pg=2> (accessed 01 April 2009).

¹⁹ Dana Hedgpeth, "Inspector General Details Failures of Iraq Reconstruction," *The Washington Post*, 22 March 2007, 17, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/21/AR2007032102418.html> (accessed 28 March 2009).

²⁰ Robert M. Perito, "The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified," United States Institute of Peace, April 2005 Special Report No. 137, 3, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr137.html> (accessed 28 March 2009).

²¹ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *The Iraq War: Learning From the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future*, Strategic Studies Institute (U.S. Army War College, 2007), 24.

²² David C. Hendrickson, Robert W. Tucker, *Revisions in need of revising: What went wrong in the Iraq War*, Strategic Studies Institute (U.S. Army War College, 2005), v.

²³ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision* (New York, NY, HarperCollins, 2008), table 425.

Defense Corps (ICDC).²⁴ The Coalition Provisional Authority also tried to help with this problem by putting over 200,000 Iraqi Security Forces and 40,000 police back on the payroll.²⁵ The police and security forces were ill-equipped, and had no way of tracking what material they did have, which made them very ineffective.²⁶ Even as late as 2007, they were still having these same issues.²⁷

The lack of security forced Coalition forces to turn to private security firms to help mitigate gaps in security. The implications of this are too far reaching to fully address in this paper, but there is one specific point that is especially relevant. These contracted security firms, or mercenaries, were seen as under control of the Americans, when in fact they operated with only their limited objective in mind. That limited goal was only the personal protection of whoever hired them. They disregarded what possible ramifications might be from how they performed their jobs. In his well publicized book *Fiasco*, Thomas E. Ricks quotes Marine Col. T. X. Hammes who says contracted security completely disregarded the local population and “generally treated the locals as expendable”.²⁸ The negative impact from this cannot be measured, but the lack of trust they created with this attitude damages the political efforts to win over the population making security even more difficult.²⁹

CENTCOM did not begin to plan for assisting indigenous security forces until after Baghdad fell. The United States military still had not learned the proper lessons from previous conflicts and did not instill those lessons learned into their doctrine with regards to

²⁴ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision* (New York, NY, HarperCollins, 2008), table 435.

²⁵ Faleh A. Jabar, *Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction and Legitimacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, Special Report 120, May 2004), 6.

²⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, Adam Mausner, *Iraqi Force Development: Conditions for Success, Consequences of Failure* (Washington, DC, Center for Strategic Studies, 2007), 125.

²⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman, Adam Mausner, *Iraqi Force Development: Conditions for Success, Consequences of Failure* (Washington, DC, Center for Strategic Studies, 2007), 115.

²⁸ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York, NY: Penguin, 2006), 371.

²⁹ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York, NY: Penguin, 2006), 372.

planning for logistical assistance to indigenous security forces immediately following the end of major combat operations.

ANALYSIS

The United States is currently the world's most experienced country in terms of rebuilding nations.³⁰ Despite this fact, mistakes have been made by the United States which cover the whole spectrum of SSTR. There are numerous published reports and books on the topics of what went wrong in United States' nation building efforts, but very few that actually give concrete recommendations for an operational level commander to use in planning for future operations. More specifically, reports discussing the lack of logistical support for indigenous security forces and what the operational commander should do about it are rare. Therefore operational commanders' staffs have not planned well for logistics support for indigenous security forces. This is despite the fact that joint doctrine does require the Combatant Commands to include plans for the post conflict phases.³¹

Operational commands must understand their importance in the post major combat operations of a conflict and their relationship to indigenous security forces. These commands control the front line through all phases of a conflict. That immediate presence makes them the most important organization in setting the stage for smooth transition through the phases of SSTR. The forces commanded by the operational commanders have immediate contact with indigenous populations and the security forces that should eventually take control.

It is not the policy of the United States military to become a long term police force.³² To avoid this fate, the United States' military must assist the indigenous security forces so

³⁰ James Dobbins, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), iii.

³¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (Washington, D.C.: DoD, 28 November 2005), 9.

³² U.S. Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office 1940. 12-2.

those indigenous forces can quickly help establish security and prevent the Americans from looking like an oppressive occupying force. As suggested in the previously discussed conflicts, foreign militaries can only maintain stability for a finite amount of time, and the cooperation and turn over to indigenous security forces must take place as quickly as possible. In this respect the phases of SSTR need to look increasingly more like Peace Operations the further along the SSTR timeline the operation proceeds. According to Joint Pub 3.07.03 Peace Operations, increased cooperation with and increased responsibilities handed to indigenous security forces “promotes consent and legitimacy, and encourages parties to the conflict to work toward a peaceful settlement, thereby facilitating the transition to civil control.”³³

If operational commanders must be ready to support the logistical needs of indigenous security forces, then their J-4 directorate must put some mechanism in place to meet the requirements of Joint Doctrine. Joint Doctrine does recognize that logisticians will need to plan to assist indigenous security forces.³⁴ It is critical that a plan be in place well in advance of phases IV and V, since during these phases “logisticians will have competing requirements to include supporting stability operations, providing basic services and humanitarian relief, and assisting reconstruction efforts.”³⁵ These competing requirements will place an increased burden on the logistics staff when they have to deal with other government and non-government agencies.³⁶

A J-4 PLANNING CELL IS RECOMMENDED

³³ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Peace Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07.03, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 October 2007), viii.

³⁴ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Logistics*, Joint Publication 4.0, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 18 July 2008), III-6.

³⁵ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Logistics*, Joint Publication 4.0. (Washington, DC: CJCS, 18 July 2008), IV-3.

³⁶ David S. Alberts, *Coalition Command and Control: Peace Operations*, National Defense University Strategic Forum, Number 10 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 1994), 4.

The mechanism which should be put in place to help the commander plan for logistical support of the indigenous security forces is a planning cell within the J-4, Logistics, Directorate. This J-4 planning cell must be adequately staffed and be tasked with researching and planning support for all the logistical needs of the indigenous security forces.

The timing of the cell formation is crucial. The planning cell should be formed at the very beginning of planning for an operation. The Defense Science Board rightly concluded that the United States cannot execute stability and reconstruction on short notice.³⁷ The plans have to begin well in advance.³⁸

The cell should be created within the J-4 directorate of the staff, since assessing and planning for the logistical needs of the indigenous security forces is the objective of the cell. This does not mean that the J-4 will not require information and coordination from all other directorates within the staff. The J-4 planning cell will need to have participants with knowledge in all areas of expertise. This would include but not be limited to all J codes, a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), a civilian staff member who has been working with the country, and an experienced special operator.³⁹ Communication with other government agencies is also crucial and will be discussed later.

Perhaps the most important representative from other directorates to the cell will be the J-2. The J-2 representative to the cell will have to help develop as clear a picture as possible of the indigenous security forces prior to, during and after major combat. The emphasis should not be put solely on the security force strength before and during combat, since the knowledge and intelligence for phases after major combat are just as important as

³⁷ Defense Science Board, *2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities*, (Washington, D.C.: Defense Science Board, December 2004), vii.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Dobbins, James, et al. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2003), 114.

information about the enemy during combat.⁴⁰ Unfortunately, in previous conflicts this information has not been available.⁴¹ Timely, accurate information and intelligence will drive everything else done by the cell.

A representative from the operations and plans directorates should also be involved. These representatives will be able to help ensure any proposed plan fits within the framework of operational plans either in development or already approved for execution.

If available, FAOs or regional specialists should be consulted. There will be many aspects of the cultural and traditional social dynamics of the indigenous population and security forces that can impact plans. A command structure for a logistical organization will likely have to be proposed.⁴² Local knowledge provided by the FAOs and regional specialists will be extremely beneficial when trying to determine what logistical organizational structure would work the best for the indigenous security forces.

This cell, although run within the operational commander's staff, must plan alongside other agencies. Civilian government entities have noted the need to plan better for the post conflict phases, and the military needs to do this as well. In July 2004 President George Bush created the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).⁴³ The S/CRS intends to work alongside the military during the

⁴⁰ Defense Science Board, *2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities*, (Washington, D.C.: Defense Science Board, December 2004), 110.

⁴¹ Defense Science Board, *2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities*, (Washington, D.C.: Defense Science Board, December 2004), 125.

⁴² James Dobbins, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 19.

⁴³ John C. Buss, *The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its interaction with the Department of Defense*, Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper Volume 09-05 (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, July 2005), 2.

planning for an operation.⁴⁴ The proposed J-4 planning cell must maintain constant communications with the S/CRS and include them in any proposals for logistical assistance to indigenous security forces.

Training of indigenous security forces may be necessary. Other directorates will need to come up with a plan for operational training of the indigenous security forces, but the J-4 planning cell will play their part as well. Organized processes for receipt, storage, and delivery of different classes of material take time to learn. If the organization is completely non-existent, as in the Iraq example, then extensive training in each of these areas will be required. It would be irresponsible to build facilities, provide equipment and hire indigenous people to work in logistics without also providing them training for their new jobs. They must have at least a rudimentary understanding of the basic processes to be effective.

Besides training, longer term liaisons may be considered and their use should be planned. This will be necessary if violence is still high enough that civilians cannot enter theater in order to take up these training and liaison positions. The ideal situation would be to get the indigenous security forces working effectively enough, and the violence controlled enough that interaction on logistics can be handed over to a State Department representative.

Infrastructure will need to be analyzed by the cell. This will include everything from warehouses and distribution hubs to command and control facilities. There is a good chance that these facilities will all have been targeted during the operation, potentially making them inadequate immediately following major combat. Not assessing the anticipated infrastructure

⁴⁴ John C. Buss, *The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its interaction with the Department of Defense*, Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper Volume 09-05 (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, July 2005), 3.

needs might lead to another mistake like the one in Iraq, where no plans for reconstruction were made until after combat.⁴⁵

The readiness of the indigenous security forces logistical transportation systems will also need to be assessed. How much material they will be moving, where they will move the material, how it should be most effectively moved, the types and numbers of all material handling equipment and transport vehicles will all be a part of this equation.

The type of equipment and amount of equipment necessary for the indigenous security forces to adequately perform their job should never be underestimated. The cell should begin to assess the basic material needs, since some of the equipment may require a long lead time to acquire. Once again, to use the Iraq operation as an example, the security forces for a long time were severely deficient in proper gear and were out gunned by the insurgents.⁴⁶

Contracting will become a planning issue for the cell as well. They will need to coordinate with the S/CRS to ensure both military and civilian personnel are in place as soon as the build-up of indigenous security forces begins.⁴⁷ This will be important to insure the funds spent on material and supplies for the indigenous security forces are well spent to facilitate the rapid equipping of the forces. Purchases for indigenous security forces will have to happen quickly, and the extra contractors will allow the commanders the flexibility to

⁴⁵ Dana Hedgpeth, "Inspector General Details Failures of Iraq Reconstruction," *The Washington Post*, 22 March 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/21/AR2007032102418.html> (accessed 28 March 2009).

⁴⁶ Robert M. Perito, "The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified," United States Institute of Peace, April 2005 Special Report No. 137, 12, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr137.html> (accessed 28 March 2009).

⁴⁷ John Hamre, et al, "Iraq's Post-Conflict Reconstruction," *Counsel on Foreign Relations*, A Field Review And Recommendations (17 July 2003), 8, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Iraq_Trip_Report.pdf (accessed 26 March 2009).

react quickly to the changing circumstances.⁴⁸ Besides helping speed up the equipping of the indigenous security forces, this effort will also help prevent the possibility of wasted funding and effort.

The commander will require a presentation of all of the information that has been gathered and analyzed. This briefing should require all pertinent information pertaining to the status of indigenous security forces along with proper courses of action. A list of essential tasks must be covered in each of the courses of action. This list should also be submitted to the S/CRS for inclusion into their Essential Task Matrix (ETM). The ETM created by S/CRS is intended to list all objectives and who is responsible for accomplishing those tasks.⁴⁹ This will be crucial to integrate any course of action into their plans and to nest the tasks under the stated objectives of the S/CRS.

The final responsibility for this planning cell will be to create metrics that will help determine the effectiveness of the plan once it has been put into action.⁵⁰ This is an important step that will help the operation shift focus of effort in the logistical support of the indigenous security forces, depending on the inevitable changing needs of those indigenous security forces.

CONCLUSIONS

The United States has a long history with SSTR operations. Lessons learned are recorded, and many reports are available for use. Unfortunately, lessons learned do not generally focus on logistical needs of the indigenous security forces. Once the combat

⁴⁸ Laura H. Baldwin, et al, *Analyzing Contingency Contracting Purchases for Operation Iraqi Freedom*, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2008), 1-2.

⁴⁹ U. S. Department of State, *US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*, U.S Department of State Publication (Washington, D.C.: Department of state, 1 December 2005), 10, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jwfcam_draft.pdf (accessed 20 April 2009)

⁵⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 28 November 2005), 9.

begins, operational commanders naturally tend to focus on phase three operations. It is important, therefore, that the commander's staff continue to look ahead.

Due to the proximity to the area of conflict and the manpower with which he is given to control a conflict, the commander is in an ideal situation to control what happens after conflict occurs, even though other government and non-government agencies will increasingly take control.

To make sure the security and stability portions of the operation are successful, the commander in charge of the operation must increasingly rely on indigenous security forces. The commander must have a plan in place as early as possible that outlines in detail what the indigenous security force will need to be successful and what their organizational structure should look like.

A security force cannot be built from the ground up simply by recruiting bodies. The indigenous security forces must be able to sustain themselves. If the indigenous security forces cannot sustain themselves, then they run the risk of being ineffective. If they become ineffective, then the local population will lose faith, and the area may become a breeding ground for insurgents. The indigenous security forces must have a logistical command and control organization and a logistical infrastructure for receipt, storage, and delivery of material to be self-sustaining. All indigenous people who will be a part of this new organization will require training to become proficient at their respective jobs.

Only when a J-4 planning cell is put in place by the United States' leadership will they have done all they possibly can to set the indigenous security forces up for success. The effort and time spent by this cell will be positive step towards quickly establishing a secure environment and reaching a desired end state.

A planning cell focusing on the logistical needs of indigenous security forces must be created prior to all future major conflicts to make sure those needs are addressed and included into the overall operational plan. The J4 should be put in charge of the cell to plan for the logistical needs of the security forces after major combat operations have ended. The planning cell must continually reassess these needs throughout the conflict and maintain constant communication with all agencies that will be involved once phase III ends and phase IV begins.

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